"It's hard to argue that the world is anything but uncertain and volatile today. But one response
is to focus more intensely on the variables you can control. You get more intensely focused on businesses where there are levers you can pull that are at least somewhat independent of and insulated from the general economy." 1 
Marc Lipschultz
Global Head of Energy & Infrastructure, KKR Secondary buyouts-transactions in which one private equity firm sells a portfolio company to another PE firm-have become an increasingly popular exit option for PE investments.
2 Although research on the attractiveness of exits through secondary buyouts (SBOs) is scarce, a few studies suggest that initial public offerings provide higher returns for private investments. 3 However, recent studies show no significant difference in returns across exit channels, 4 and conclude that PE firms look for "windows of opportunity" when exiting their investments. 5 These findings imply that SBOs cannot be perceived as a "last resort." Instead, the choice of PE exit channel appears to be determined by a number of portfolio company and market specific factors. Our study builds on this proposition, and we contribute further to the argument by investigating whether the influence of such factors has changed following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. As Marc Lipschultz suggests in the introductory quote, the increased volatility and uncertainty that followed the Global Financial Crisis are expected to lead PE firms to focus more on the things they can influence rather than relying on market sentiment. To explore this possibility, we hand-collected a data set of Danish and Swedish 6 PE exits from the period 2003 to 2013 and achieved a unique split of deals that were evenly distributed before and after the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis. Our results show that larger and better performing portfolio companies were generally more likely to be exited through an IPO than an SBO. Interestingly, we also find that operating performance and portfolio company size were better predictors of PE exit choices (IPO vs. SBO) after the Global Financial Crisis than before the crisis.
Consistent with earlier research, we also find that market conditions in terms of equity market developments, debt market spread, and GDP growth were important predictors of PE exit type. All this suggests that PE firms take general market conditions into consideration when choosing between exit channels, but that portfolio company fundamentals have become increasingly important in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
One important element in the PE model is that portfolio companies are owned for a definite period whereupon they are exited through one of three main exit channels: an IPO, a trade sale to a strategic acquirer, or an SBO. 7 Since the trade sale exit channel is somewhat harder to predict, we 6 Denmark and Sweden constitute an appropriate research setting because the Nordic PE markets are generally very mature. The Nordics have one of the highest PE penetrations in the world (measured as the ratio of PE-backed business' enterprise value to GDP). In 2011, that ratio was 1.2 for the Nordic region whereas it was 1.1 in the US. In addition, the Nordic region outperformed both Europe (ex. High-performing PE portfolio companies are also more likely to have repaid their debt with the substantial operating cash flows generated from the profitable operations. And as result, a significant refinancing is unlikely to be required when the portfolio company is to be exited. In this scenario, one of PE firms' key comparative advantages vis-à-vis the public company ownership model-notably, the ability of PE firms to raise and manage debt capital 13 -is less relevant. This also points to SBOs being less likely for portfolio companies with strong operating performance and more likely when portfolio company performance is weaker at the time of exit and PE firms'
comparative advantage in raising debt will be of greater value.
Poor performing portfolio companies may also have more room for improvement since the first PE investor is unlikely to have realized the entire operational optimization potential during their ownership period. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that PE firms would rather cut their losses on low-performing portfolio companies than try to turn them around. 14 The SBO exit option is relatively quicker than an IPO, which suggests that some PE firms may generally attempt to offload poor-performing portfolio companies to other PE firms, perhaps those specializing in turnarounds and seeking failing but salvageable investments at relatively low valuations. Again, this supports the notion that weaker performing portfolio companies are more likely to be exited through an SBO. All this leads to our first hypothesis about the association between operating performance and the choice between SBO and IPO exits for PE firms:
Hypothesis H1: The better the portfolio company's operating performance at the time of exit, the higher the probability that the PE firm will exit through an IPO rather than an SBO.
There is considerable evidence that PE firms often attempt to time the exit of their portfolio companies when conditions in equity or debt markets are favorable. 15 Indeed, one research paper went so far as to claim that "market conditions are the most important factor in the decision to go public." 16 Nevertheless, one key insight in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis was that the world is more complex and uncertain than previously thought. 17 And one traditional response to increased environmental complexity and uncertainty is to pay more attention to the elements of a business that one can influence. To the extent this is so, PE firms with a finite holding period and great uncertainty about financial market conditions might therefore be expected to focus more on operating improvements after the Global Financial Crisis than before this crisis.
This leads to our second hypothesis about the association between operating performance and the choice between SBO and IPO exits for PE firms:
15 See e.g. 18 The Swedish equivalent does not provide a data list of PE exits. 19 We use EBIT instead of the more conventional EBITDA in the analysis because EBITDA is not explicitly reported in all Danish and Swedish annual reports whereas EBIT is. For the purpose of using objective variables and avoiding subjective judgment, we decided to use EBIT. We did, however, check if the results had been different with our calculated EBITDAs, which they had not.
The Global Financial Crisis had two major parts: the first beginning in September 2007, and the second beginning in September 2008. We set the date for the structural break as September 1, 2007, where the uncertainty in the market had begun. This structural break allows our analysis to have 44 observations in each period. Descriptives can be found in Table 2 . Table 3 shows the Correlation Matrix. We did not encounter problems with multicollinearity.
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We are confident that our dataset is representative because the PE exits were identified using several databases and we validated these databases by consulting all the major Danish and Swedish PE firms' homepages in order to identify the transactions they had been involved with.
Regression Results
To test for Hypothesis H1, we first ran a regression model on the entire period from 2003-13.
Afterwards we investigated the periods before and after the Global Financial Crisis to test for Hypothesis H2. We used probit models since the dependent variable is a binary dummy (IPO or SBO). 21 The models were run with robust standard errors.
20 No variable has a Variance-Inflation-Factor (VIF) above 1.7, which is well below the limits for signs of multicollinearity. 21 The main results are robust as they do not change if a logistic model is applied instead.
The Choice between IPOs and SBOs
In the first model, we tested whether portfolio companies with better operating performance at the time of exit had a higher probability of exiting through an IPO rather than an SBO. The findings are presented in Panel A in Table 4 . We controlled for industry as well as the specified market factors. The variables of most interest are the following portfolio company-specific variables: EBIT Margin exit ; Debt/Assets exit ; Asset Turnover exit ; and Size exit . As reported in Table 4 , larger EBIT margins, lower leverage (Debt/Assets) ratios, and larger companies (Total Assets) were all associated with a higher probability that the portfolio company would exit through an IPO. (And all three variables are highly significant.) Asset Turnover, somewhat surprisingly, was not significant, which might suggest a stronger emphasis on operating profit than on asset utilization when it comes to exit considerations. As expected, and in accordance with prior empirical research, increases in the equity markets and general economic growth were also positively associated with IPOs. 22 And, finally, a reduction in the risk appetite of debt markets (an increase in the Debt Market variable, the spread between long-term and short-term bonds) also signaled a higher chance of an IPO exit as expected because it would be harder for PE firms to raise debt for an SBO.
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The Choice between IPOs and SBOs Before and After the Global Financial Crisis
To test our second hypothesis, we analyzed whether the Global Financial Crisis constitutes a structural break when it comes to operating performance's importance as a determinant of PE exits. The results are presented in Panel B in Table 4 . The regression model is the same as the one use to test our first hypothesis, with the only difference being the time periods. 22 We also investigated volatility in the equity markets but did not include it in the models because it had little predictive power and was heavily correlated with the equity market variable.
As summarized in Table 4 , our findings provided support for our second hypothesis by showing that both EBIT Margin exit and Size exit , although not significant before the crisis, were highly significant after the crisis. To formally test whether the impact of the portfolio company factors was significantly different in the two periods, we performed a Chow-test. This test also supported Hypothesis H2, finding that both variables had structural breaks within 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 23 In addition, Debt/Assets exit was more significant and the coefficient was larger after the Global Financial Crisis (though the relationship was not strong enough for the Chow test to be significant).
Case Examples
One example that illustrates how operating performance has become increasingly important for exit choices is the case of KMD, a Danish software company that which was sold by two Danish private equity firms, EQT and ATP PEP, to Advent International, another PE firm. The announcement date was in October, 2012, which followed an equity market rally of 33.2% during the previous 12 months. (The median PE exit, including IPOs as well as SBOs, throughout the entire period of our study (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) had followed equity market increases of 21.9%. KMD had assets at exit of 3.4
billion DKK (about $500 million) and revenue of 4.3 billion DKK ($630 million), making it one of the larger portfolio companies in the data set. In addition, it was a relatively well-known company in Denmark with 3,400 employees. Combined with Debt/Assets of just 60%, these facts would lead most to think that it was the perfect IPO candidate. However, with an EBIT margin at exit of just 8.5%, which was equivalent to the average before the crisis, the selling PE firms went for an SBO.
23 The Chow test for EBIT Margin Exit and Size Exit found structural breaks with p-values of .013 and .063, respectively.
Another case is Inflight Service, a Swedish supplier of merchandise and related business solutions to the retail travel industry. CapMan exited the investment in December 2009 by divesting to Triton. Although the equity markets had increased by an impressive 49.5% during the 12 months that led up to the divestiture, such positive market conditions could not outweigh the effect of a poor EBIT margin of 4.6%, which presumably was the main factor in the portfolio company's exited through an SBO.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that operating performance and portfolio company size are more important determinants of PE exit channels after the Global Financial Crisis than before this crisis.
Our findings emphasize the growing need for PE firms to improve operating performance to have the opportunity to use the IPO exit channel. The main implication for decision-makers in PE firms is that they can no longer base an exit strategy solely on promising market conditions; they also need to incorporate operational improvements during the ownership-period by deploying operational engineering capabilities in portfolio companies. Our results also imply that a PE firm pitching a wellperforming portfolio company for sale in an SBO could be interpreted as a sign that the selling PE firm expects market conditions to get worse in the near future.
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